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Abstract 
This study was designed to detennine (a) whether children with 
intellectual disabilities have a theory of mind deficit relative to younger 
children of the same verbal mental age and (b) whether theory of mind in 
children with intellectual disabilities is domain-specitic or related to other 
general cognitive functions. A group of 15 children with intellectual 
disabilities (mean age= 10;0), 15 children of average intelligence (mean age= 
I 0;0) and 15 children of average intelligence (mean age= 6:0) matched on 
verbal mental age with the children with intellectual disabilities. 
The children were given a series of theory of mind tasks. The children 
with intellectual disabilities were significantly lower on theory of mind 
performance !Tom the children of average intelligence of the same age, but not 
!rom the younger children of average intelligence matched lor verbal mental 
age. This indicates that the children with intellectual disabilities do not exhibit 
a theory of mind deficit relative to other children of the same verbal mental 
age. General cognitive functioning accounted for the ditTerence between the 
groups and was significantly correlated with theory of mind perfonnance in the 
group with intellectual disabilities. 
It is concluded that children with intellectual disabilities do not have a 
deficit in theory of mind relative to younger children of the same verbal mental 
age, and that theory of mind in children with intellectual disabilities is not 
domain-specific, but is related to verbal skills and general cognitive 
functioning. 
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Background 
Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
Children with intellectual disabilities arc those who have a low level of 
intellectual functioning and poor adaptive skills (Beime-Smith. Patton, & 
lttenbach, 1994). Both of these terms arc included in the detinition provided 
by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR): 
Mental retardation reters to substantial limitations in present 
functioning. It is characterised by signiticantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related 
limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive 
skill areas: communication, selkare, home living, social skills, 
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional 
academics, leisure and work. (American Association on Mental 
Retardation, 1992). 
Australia primarily uses the AAMR definition in describing children 
with inteliectual disabilities, with an emphasis on a clinical/medical model to 
determine symptom seYerity. Categories are employed in terms oflQ range. 
For example, children with an IQ score trom 55 - 75 are classified as having a 
mild intellectual disability, children with an IQ score from 30- 55 are 
classified as having a moderate intellectual disability. and children with an IQ 
score below 30 are classified as having a severe intellectual disability (Drew, 
Hardman & Logan. 1988 ). The present thesis is concerned with those in the 
mild to moderate range of intellectual disabilities. 
More males than females are diagnosed with an intellec\Ual disability. 
Children with intellectual disabilities are also more likely to live in single 
parent families and come from low socioeconomic status families (Beirne-
Smith, Patton, & lttenbach, 1994 ). 
Estimates of the prevalence of intellectual disabilities vary !Tom 0.4% to 
3% of the total population (McLaren & Bryson, 1987) and most of these fall 
within the mild to moderate range, which is the group that is being targeted for 
this study. 
Children with mild to moderate intellectual disabilities often have 
motivational and behavioural characteristics such as: a delay in developing 
self-regulating behaviours, difficulty in establishing and maintaining 
interpersonal relationships and social skill deficits (Beirne-Smith, Patton & 
lttenbach, 1994 ). 
Difficulty in establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships 
and in social skills has been attributed to difficulties that children with 
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intellectual disabilities experience in understanding other people's beliels and 
desires (MitchelL 1997). If a child is unable to understand another"s beliefs or 
desires, he or she may have ditllculty seeing things li·om the other person's 
perspective. showing empathy with how the other person is feeling and seeing 
the motives for another person's actions. All of these may lead to the child not 
responding in an appropriate. socially accepted manner towards another 
person, leading to possible conflicts or poor relationships with other children. 
The growing child gradually gains an understanding of other peoples 
desires, beliets and intentions. This allows him or her to interpret the 
behaviour of others in a meaning!til way (Wellman. 1992). An understanding 
ofbelietS and desires improves social interactions. For example, an 
understanding of the actions ofbeliefand desire can be used in play situations. 
Children may use their knowledge of beliefs and desires to allow them to 
assign roles for play activities. 
In other words, young children begin to develop a theory of how 
people's minds work, which allows them to interpret others' actions in terms 
oftheir beliefs and desires. This is called the child's "theory of mind". If a 
child is delayed in developing such a theory of mind then he or she is unable to 
attribute beliefs or desires to another person, making it very d itllcult for the 
child to understand or predict the behaviour of that person. 
Children with intellectual disabilities do exhibit some social difficulties. 
Benson, Abbeduto, Short, Nuccio & Maas ( 1993) propose that it may be 
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because these children have a poorly developed theory of mind. The present 
thesis aims to explore this tl1rthcr. 
Purpose 
The purpose of the current study is to detcnninc whether children with 
mild to moderate mtelleetual disabilities have a delk1t in theory of mind and to 
examine some poss1hle reasons lOr this_ In order to investigate this, the 
children m this study were given a set of tasks designed to test their theory of 
mind The study is designed to explore and. if possible eliminate, alternative 
reasons for any Jiffercnct.:s m theory of mind perf0rmance fOund between 
children with intellectual disabilities and children of average intelligence. 
One such reason is that children with imcllcctual disabilities do not 
remember the details of the task as well as children of average intelligence. 
Children who arc less able to remember the details of a scenario will perform 
more poorly on tasks designed to test theory of mind. not necessarily because 
they lack a theory of mind. hut simply because of their more limited memory. 
Memory check questions arc used in this study to ensure that students arc able 
to remember the appropriate scenarios. This is imponant as students with 
intellectual disabilities have been found to exhibit deticits in memory 
poriormance (Beirne-Smith. Patton & lttenbach. 1994 ). 
Another possible reason for poorer perlbrmance of children with 
intellectual disabilities on theory of mind tasks is that their level of general 
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cognitive functioning is lower. Therefore, a measure of cognitive functioning 
(Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices [RCPM], 1990) is used in the study to 
determine whether or not theory of mind deticits could be attributed to general 
deficits in cognitive ti.mctioning, as opposed to specific theory of mind deficits 
(Baron-Cohen, 1991 ). 
There tore this study is designed to examine not only whether children 
with intellectual disabilities demonstrated deficits in theory of mind, but also 
whether that deficit can be accounted tor by a more limited memory or by their 
generally lower level of cognitive functioning. 
Significance 
It is important to study theory of mind because theory of mind is 
considered to be of value in a wide variety of social situations. Mitchell 
(1997) describes being aware of others' thoughts and feelings as being 
necessary in order to be socially accepted by others. It also allows children to 
avoid or defuse conflict situations with others by enabling children to see the 
other's point of view and not only their O\'i:1. This has particular relevance for 
those children with mild to moderate disabilities as they are integrated into 
mainstream classes for their education. 
Welch-Ross ( 1997) describes the importance of having an 
understanding of others' minds in order to engage in everyday social 
exchanges which contribute to the development of advanced cognitive 
5 
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processes. She argues that the "skills that are required to succeed on theory of 
mind tasks may be necessary tor engaging in particular social interactions with 
peers" (p. 626). These interactions incluJe such things as making joint 
proposals for activities and for assigning roles during pretend play. 
Mitchell ( 1997) states that "a conception of mind is also vital in 
tbrming triendships" (p. 6). It enables children to distinguish those with whom 
they should form lasting and trusting tfiendships. Those who have a similar 
outlook on lite, with similar interests and desires. can be judged through 
children's conception of mind. 
This study is also signiticant in that it investigates theory of mind in a 
population in which there is still little research. Most of the studies on theory 
of mind have been conducted with autistic children. In these studies, learning 
disabled or intellectually disabled children have been included only as control 
groups (Frithe, Happe, & Siddons 1994; Happe, 1995; Charman & Baron-
Cohen, 1992). Very few studies have examined children from other 
populations. Those that have conducted ditlerent studies have studied 
children with a hearing impairment. children with Down Syndrome, children 
with intellectual disabilities and children of average intelligence (Zelazo, 
Burack, Benedetto & Frye, 1996; Benson, Abbeduto, Short, Nuccio & Maas, 
1993, Peterson & Siegal, 1995, Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
This study is also significant because it wiii examine some ofthe 
possible reasons that may account for children with intellectual disabilities 
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having a poor theory of mind. The factors which will be examined, memory 
and cognitive functioning, are known to be at a poorer level in children with 
intellectual disabilities than children with average intelligence (Drew, 
Hardman & Logan, 1988; Beirne-Smith, Patton & lttenbach, 1994). The 
children with intellectual disabilities may find it more difficult to remember the 
scenarios presented to them, which may in tum impair their ability to give 
correct answers to theory of mind tasks. It is also known that children with 
intellectual disabilities are often delayed in their general cognitive 
development, and therefore a poorer theory of mind pertbrrnance between the 
children with intellectual disabilities and children of the same age with average 
intelligence may be explained by their overall poorer level of cognitive 
functioning rather than a more specific deficit in theory in mind. 
The evidence suggests that more research needs to be undertaken to 
determine whether individuals with an intellectual disability show evidence of 
theory of mind deficits and whether these deficits have some relation to other 
areas of cognitive functioning. This research is also deemed to be important 
from a social skills aspect, as having a theory of mind may be a key to some 
deficiencies experienced in this area by children with intellectual disabilities. 
7 
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Definitions of Terms 
Several key terms will be used a number of times in this thesis, and 
therefore definitions of these terms are given below. These terms will be 
discussed in greater detail in the literature review. 
Beliefs 
Beliefs are detined more broadly in the literature on theory of mind than 
the general use of the term. Theory of mind proponents state that beliefs are 
such things as knowing (having a true belief), guessing (having a belief that 
may or may not be true), surmising (having a belief that may or may not be 
true), doubting (having a beliefthat may be false) and being sure (having a 
true belief). True beliefs are rooted in reality rather than fantasy. False beliefs 
occur when a person has an inaccurate conviction about a situation (Wellman, 
1992). 
Desires 
Desires are also defined in a broader manner in the theory of mind 
literature than the generally accepted term. Desires are said to be such things 
as wishes (a short term desire), preferences (a desire tbr a particular 
item/situation), goals (a long term desire) and hopes (a desire tbr the future). 
Because desires are not outwardly visible, they must be interred by the 
observer. 
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Intentions 
An intentional action is one where a person decides on a course of 
action deliberately. Both beliefs and desires are needed to provide 
explanations for intentional actions. For example, if a person desires (wants) a 
biscuit and they believe that a biscuit is located in a cookie jar, their intentional 
act will be to go to the cookie jar to get a biscuit. 
Specificity 
The speciticity hypothesis refers to the claims made by some 
researchers (Tager-Fiusberg, 1992 ~ Swettenham, 1996; Charman & Baron-
Cohen, 1992; Leslie, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1991) that theory of mind is a 
cognitive function in its own right, separate !rom other normally developing 
cognitive functions, such as language, executive function, and memory. 
Uniq11eness 
The uniqueness hypothesis refers to the claim made by some 
researchers (Happe, 1995~ Swettenham, 1996; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Ozonoff & 
Miller, 1995; and Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992) that a theory of mind 
deficit is only found in children with autism, and is not found in any other 
population, not even in children with intellectual disabilities. 
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Overview 
The following chapter deals with relevant literature on theory of mind, 
its development in normal children and its development in children with 
disabilities. It also describes some of the possible reasons for theory of mind 
deficits in children with intellectual disabilities, in particular, memory and 
cognitive functioning and how these are to be assessed in this study. All ofthe 
tasks that are used to assess theory of mind in children are described in detail 
and the relevance ofthese tasks to theory of mind is discussed. The theoretical 
framework that is adopted for this study is also presented, followed by the 
research questions that were addressed tor this study. 
The next chapter is the method chapter. This chapter describes the 
participants of the study and their relevant characteristics. The procedure that 
is to be used will also be detailed. Following the method chapter is the results 
chapter. This chapter describes the results obtained from the study, whether 
there were any differences between the groups on theory of mind performance 
and whether or not these differences could be accounted for by memory and/or 
general cognitive functioning. 
Following the results chapter is the discussion chapter. This chapter 
seeks to discuss the results in the context of other research, explain possible 
reasons for the results obtained and discuss implications of the results for 
future research and education of students with disabilities. 
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter explains what theory of mind is, identilies relevant literature on 
theory of mind and discusses some of the issues in the theory of mind area. It 
also explains the normal development of theory of mind and its development in 
individuals from other populations. Other factors which may account for a 
theory of mind delicit in individuals are also explored. 
Wit at is Tlleory• of Mind? 
Theory of mind reters to " the capacity to attribute mental states to 
oneself and to others and to interpret behaviour in terms of mental states" 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995, p. 55). For example, suppose there are two children, 
Tommy and Keith. If Tommy goes to the biscuit tin which is kept in the 
cupboard, Keith would be displaying a theory of mind if he assumed that 
Tommy wants a biscuit and that his actions are explained by this unobservable 
desire. This is an example of theory of mind because the actions of Tommy 
arc being interpreted in terms of a mental state that cannot possibly be 
observed. On the other hand, if Tommy went to the biscuit tin to look for a 
biscuit, but Keith knew that the biscuits were still in the shopping basket and 
I I 
had not yet been put away, Keith would display a theory of mind if he was 
aware that Tommy held a false belief. Theory of mind is deemed to be a theory 
because it allows people to predict another person's behaviour from an 
unobservable source. A theory of mind is used in everyday social interactions 
between people. It allows people to understand the desires and beliefs of 
others. 
The underpinnings of theory of mind begin with Flavell's work on the 
perspective-taking abilities of young children as early as 1958. Investigators 
such as Wellman, Premack and Woodruff, Bretherton and Beeghly and Leslie, 
who published in the 1980s and 1990s, were concerned with the commonsense 
understanding with which the mind brings order to the social events which 
surround people (Flavell, Miller & Miller, 1993). This commonsense 
understanding has been termed "tolk psychology". 
More recently this work has become more restricted by theorists in a 
theory-based approach which reters to a" ... more abstract, causal-
explanatory system that allows the child to explain and predict behaviour by 
referring to unobservable mental states such as beliefs and desires" (Flavell, 
Miller & Miller, 1993, p. I 01 ). Current theorists propose that children have 
coherent concepts about the mind and behaviour and how the two are 
interrelated. This is still a relatively new field of study and a great deal more is 
still to be learnt about the development of a theory of mind, who does or does 
not have a theory of mind, and the usefulness of having a theory of mind in 
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today's society. The relevance of this subject to education is also still under 
study, but there may be implications for the teaching of social skills to 
children, particularly children with disabilities who have shown some deficits 
or delays in this area. 
Development of Theory of Mind in the Normal Population 
There is evidence that children begin to develop a theory of mind from 
3 or 4 years of age. This is a basic theory of mind, which, according to 
Wellman ( 1992), develops in complexity as the child's development 
progresses. Mitchell ( 1997) provides the evidence that theory of mind begins 
at this age by explaining that children who cannot acknowledge a false belief, 
Jack a theory of mind. He states that the children that cannot acknowledge a 
false belief are unable to distinguish correctly between belief and reality and 
therefore do not display the underlying "ognitive competence that is necessary 
to distinguish another person's false belief Once a child is able to distinguish 
between belief and reality he or she is able to understand false beliefs more 
easily and begin to obtain a theory of mind. 
Flavell, Miller and Miller ( 1993) state that the first thing a child needs 
to obtain a theory of mind, is to have awareness that there is such a thing as a 
mind and that humans think. An example that they give of this is when an 
infant attempts to communicate with other people rather than with inanimate 
objects. They state that infants do not infer mental states, but rather assume 
13 
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that the other person will respond to them. Although the infant has an 
emerging awareness ofthe mind, he or she is not yet able to apply this 
knowledge with any skill. 
At around 2 or 3 years of age, the infant recognises that the mind has a 
relationship with behaviour, objects and events. This is sometimes called a 
perspective-taking ability. For example, the child may manipulate the 
environment to hide an object so that another person cannot see it. The 2-year-
old who i1as taken her baby brother's dummy may hide it behind her back 
when her mother enters the room, so that her mother cannot see that she has 
taken it. Here the child is able to difTerentiate between her own point of view 
and the point of view of another person. This is considered to be an important 
precursor to theory of mind abilities, and one which must be present before the 
child can be said to have a theory of mind 
The proposed beginning of theory of mind development at around 3 or 
4 years of age, centres around the notion of a person's belief and the fact that 
people can hold false beliefs. When children realise that a false belief can be 
held by another person (or themselves), they are beginning to develop a theory 
of how minds work (Mitchell, 1997). As an example of false beliefs, consider 
the following scenario. Jennifer had some Jollies and put them in a box and 
left the room. The Jollies were moved from the box to a cupboard, while 
Jennifer was away. When Jennifer returned to the room she would look for the 
Jollies in the box because she holds a false belief that the Jollies are where she 
14 
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left them. Children below the age of3, normally have difficulty with this 
problem and state that Jennifer will look in the cupbcard because that is where 
the Jollies really are. Children at this age tail to appreciate that Jennifer will 
look for the loll ies in the last place that she saw them, rather than in their new 
location, and that therefore Jennifer holds a false belief The understanding of 
one person's false belief, which is acquired by children aged 3 or 4, is often 
known as a tirst-order false belief (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
The final stage of theory of mind development centres around the 
second-order talse belief tasks. In order to conduct a more difficult test of 
false belief, Baron-Cohen ( 1995) devised a second-order talse belief task. This 
task involves a person being able to understand nested beliets. That is the 
person must understand one person's beliefs about another person's beliefs. 
For example, "Anne thinks that Sally thinks ... ". Second-order false belief 
tasks are able to be understood by normally developing 6-7 year olds. From 
this age onwards, the theory of mind ofthe child grows in complexity and is 
refined. Higher order beliets (ie third and fourth-order beliefs) are not 
considered in this study as they are too advanced for the participants of the 
study. 
Development of a Theory of Mind in Other Populations 
Much less research has been conducted on theory of mind development 
in individuals from other populations than the normal population. Populations 
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which have been studied include children with Down Syndrome, children with 
a hearing impainment, children with intellectual disabilities and children with a 
vision impairment. These studies however are very limited, as there are 
generally only one or two studies which focus on each of these disabilities. 
As there has not been much research on other populations there is little 
evidence from these populations as to their theory of mind development. 
Therefore there is debate as to the extent to which children with intellectual 
disabilities, in particular, have a theory of mind deficit beyond what would be 
expected given their general cognitive tunct10ning or intelligence. Theories 
relevant to this debate and research evidence are discussed in the following 
sections. 
Uniqueness 
Some theorists (Leslie, 1992) suggest that a theory of mind may never 
or rarely be achieved by people in one population, specifically children with 
autism. It is suggested that deficits in theory of mind perfonmance may be 
attributed to a deficit in one area of social cognition. These theorists propose 
that a deficit in theory of mind is unique to children with autism and that no 
other population exhibits such deficits. 
Another theory of development in other populations proposes that 
children who have a developmental delay will also experience a delay in the 
development of a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1991 ). This means that if a 
16 
child is delayed in other areas of his or her development, such as a child with 
intellectual disabilities, then it is likely that he or she will exhibit a delay in the 
attainment of theory of mind as well. Such a child's theory of mind will be 
slower to develop when compared with average children of the same mental 
age. 
A great deal of research (Happe, 1995; Swettenham, 1996; Baron-
Cohen, 1995: Ozonoft' & Miller, 1995; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992). 
suggests that theory of mind deficits, are unique to autistic children. This 
means that the deficit found in autistic children is beyond what could 
reasonably be assumed to be a developmental delay. This uniqueness 
hypothesis has in turn led to the hypothesis that a theory of mind deficiency is 
one of the underlying causes of the social difficulties faced by individuals with 
autism. There is however a great deal of debate among researchers en this 
issue, as some researchers (Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto & Frye, 1996, Tager-
Fiusberg & Sullivan, 1994, Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991) state that 
other populations may be affected in a social functioning manner by theory of 
mind deficits, even ifthese are not as severe as those experienced by autistic 
children. 
The first half of Table I summarises the main studies that have reported 
deficits in the theory of mind abilities of autistic children relative to various 
control groups, and have concluded that theory of mind deficits are unique to 
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Table I. ,'-J'tudies that examined the Uniqueness Hypothesis. 
Author/s Groups 
(Mean Age) 
Studies Supporting Uniqueness Hypothesis 
Swettenham 
(1996) 
Happe(l995) 
Channan, & 
Baron-Cohen 
( 1992) 
Baron-Cohen 
(1989) 
8 Autistic ( 10:9) 
8 Down Syndrome (II ;9) 
8 Average (3:5) 
70 Autistic (12:1) 
34 Intellectually Disabled 
( 12;3) 
70 Average (4:0) 
17 Autistic(13:6) 
141ntcllectually Disabled 
( 14;5) 
20 Average ( 4:4) 
I 0 Autistic ( 15:3) 
10 Down Syndrome ( 14:3) 
10 Averaue (7;5) 
Studies Not Supporting [Jniqueness Hypothesis 
Zelazo, 
Burack, 
Benedetto & 
Frye, ( 1996) 
Tager-
Flusberg & 
Sullivan, 
( 1994) 
Benson, 
Abbeduto, 
Short, Nuccio 
& Maas 
(1993) 
Ozono!T, 
Pennington & 
Rogers, ( 1991) 
12 Down Syndrome (22;7) 
12Average(5;1) 
28 Autistic (16;11) 
28 Intellectually Disabled 
( 12;5) 
18 Average (9: I) 
16 Intellectually Disabled 
( 17;5) 
16 Average (6;8) 
23 Autistic ( 12; I) 
20 Average (12;4) 
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Results 
Autistic group significantly poorer 
than the other groups at theory of 
mind transfer tasks. 
Significantly more average (58%) 
and intellectuallv disabled (56%) 
than autistic (20%) children 
performed theory of mind tasks 
correctly. 
Average and intellectually disabled 
children pt::rformed significantly 
better on theory of mind tasks than 
the autistic group. 
Significantly more average (90%) 
and Down Syndrome (60%) than 
autistic (0°;0) children passed second-
order theory of mind tasks. 
Children with Down Syndrome 
performed significantly poorer than 
an average group matched on mental 
age at theory of mind tasks. 
No ditTerence found between the 
autistic and intellectually disabled 
groups on false belief tasks. 
Adolescents with intellectual 
disabilities performed significantly 
poorer than children of average 
intelligence on theory of mind tasks. 
Autistic group performed same as 
average group on first-order theory 
of mind tasks .. 
the autistic group. The bottom half of Table I shows the main studies that 
have found deficits in children from other populations and drawn conclusions 
that children from other populations displayed theory of mind deficits and that 
therefore theory of mind deficits are not unique to children with autism. 
Swettenham ( 1996) used computer aids in his study to test and teach 
theory of mind to a group of children with autism, a group with Down 
Syndrome and a group of average intelligence. The participants for this study 
were selected on the basis of having failed on three theory of mind tasks in an 
initial assessment. Swettenham found that all of the students could pass theory 
of mind tasks after instruction using the computers, but that the autistic 
children could not pass distant transfer tasks (generalise their knowledge). He 
suggests that the children with autism could have developed an alternative 
strategy for passing the computer based theory of mind tasks, that they were 
then unable to transfer to different situations. 
Baron-Cohen ( 1989), Charman & Baron-Cohen ( 1992), and Happe 
(1995) examined similar groups in their studies. All of the studies compared 
three groups: children with autism, children with intellectual disabilities and 
children of average intelligence. All three studies reported that the children 
with autism performed at a much poorer level than either of the other two 
groups. 
On the other hand, Tager-Fiusberg & Sullivan (1994) and Ozonoff, 
Pennington & Rogers (1991) included autistic students in their studies, and 
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found no significant difference between their theory of mind performance and 
that of children with intellectual disabilities and average control groups. 
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers used participants who were close in age. They 
used autistic students who were high functioning and therefore may have been 
more socially adept than their lower functioning peers. 
Zelazo et al. (1996) found that adults with Down Syndrome 
performed more poorly on theory of mind tasks than 5-year-old children of 
average intelligence matched on mental age. They conclude that" deficits in 
theory of mind cannot invariably produce autistic behaviour, because people 
with Down Syndrome present a distinctive behavioural and social profile" (p. 
483). There is some concern, however, in regards to the severity of the 
disabled group's disability and the ages of the participants in the study. It is 
difficult to interpret a comparison between groups of such different ages. 
Although they are matched for mental age, they must surely be widely different 
in other ways. The theory of mind task is also not age appropriate tbr the 22-
year-old adults with Down Syndrome, although it is the kind of task that a 5-
year-old may be given in school. A number of other factors could also account 
for the deficit, such as the strangeness of the task, unfamiliarity with a test 
situation, language deficits and motivation. Using a closer mental age match 
would at least reduce some ofthese effects. 
One study dealt specifically with intellectual disabilities. Benson, 
Abbeduto, Short, Nuccio, & Maas (1993) conducted a study using adolescents 
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with intellectual disabilities and children of average intelligence. They used 
16 adolescents with an intellectual disability and a mean chronological age of 
17;5 and 16 children of average intelligence and a mean chronological age of 
6;8. The participants were matched on non-verbal mental age. One first-order 
and one second-order false belief story were used to test for theory of mind 
performance. Benson et al. found that the adolescents with intellectual 
disabilities performed worse than the students who were matched for mental 
age, and that the children with intellectual disabilities performed better on 
first-order, but not stcond-order tasks. 
However, they also reported some limitations of the study. The 
students were matched on non-verbal mental age. Benson, et al. (1993) 
discussed that by not controlling for linguistic ability, they were not taking the 
students' language abilities or lack thereof into account. They also used only 
one first-order and one second-order task to draw their conclusions. They 
noted that they should have used a greater number of similar tasks in order to 
obtain an accurate representation of the students' performance on theory of 
mind tasks. 
In summary, although some authors have argued that a theory of 
mind deficit is a characteristic unique to autistic children, others have 
presented evidence that children with intellectual disabilities do not differ in 
theory of mind perfonnance from autistic children, and are significantly poorer 
than children of average intelligence matched on mental age. However, these 
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studies have a number of limitations, including questionable mental age 
matches and failure to account for verbal skills. Therefore, the question of 
whether children with intellectual disabilities have a significant deficit in 
theory of mind relative to the normal population still remains open. 
Specificity 
There is debate among researchers as to whether or not theory of mind 
is a domain-specific function. Theory of mind may be regarded as domain-
specific if a child can have normal or near normal functions in other domains 
of cognition, such as executive control functions, memory and language 
ability, but nevertheless exhibits deficits in theory of mind itself. Children 
with intellectual disabilities already exhibit a developmental delay in cognitive 
areas (Zigler & Hodapp, 1986), and it may be possible that a deficit in theory 
of mind is attributable to this delay, rather than to a specific delay in theory of 
mind itself. 
A hypothesis has been made about the specificity of theory of mind 
functions (Tager-Fiusberg, 1992; Swettenham, 1996; Charman & Baron-
Cohen, 1992, Leslie, 1992 & Baron-Cohen, 1991 ). The specificity hypothesis 
states that theory of mind functions are separate from normally developing 
cognitive functions. This means that theory of mind develops in an individual 
manner, rather than developing alongside other more general cognitive 
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functions. Conversely theory of mind may not develop where other cognitive 
functions develop at a nonnal rate. 
Table 2 summarises the main studies that have examined cognitive 
ti.mctioning in relation to the theory of mind abilities of children of various 
populations. Some of the studies have found that general cognitive 
functioning is not a factor in the theory of mind abilities of the children 
examined, while others found that general cognitive functioning is a factor. 
The studies that have found general cognitive functioning to be a significant 
!actor in the theory of mind abilities ofthe children examined concluded that 
the specificity hypothesis could not be supported, while those that found 
general cognitive functioning not to be a factor, determined that theory of mind 
was a domain-specific function. 
Swettenham (I 996), in a study described earlier, found that although 
the children with autism were able to pass the set theory of mind tasks after the 
teaching session, they were not able to generalise these skills to different 
scenarios, whereas the other groups could. The fact that the children with 
autism were not able to generalise the knowledge they had been taught, 
suggests a specific deficit in this area. The fact that they were able to devise 
alternative strategies to pass the tasks suggests that the theory of mind function 
is separate to other normally developing cognitive functions. 
Leslie ( 1992) conducted a study involving autistic children, children 
with Down Syndrome and children of average intelligence. He used a false 
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Table 2. Studies that examined the Specificity Hypothesis. 
Author Group 
(Mean Age) 
Result 
Studies supporting the specificity hypothesis 
Swettenham 
(1996) 
Charman& 
Baron-Cohen, 
( 1992) 
Leslie, (1992) 
Baron-Cohen, 
(1989) 
8 Autistic (10;9) 
8 Down Syndrome 
(11;9) 
8 Average (3;5) 
17 Autistic (13;6) 
14 Intellectually 
Disabled (14;5) 
20 Average (4;4) 
Autistic (13;8) 
Down Syndrome 
(12;6) 
Average (4;0) 
10 Autistic (15;3) 
10 Down 
Syndrome (14;3) 
10 Average (7;5) 
Autistic childretl were impaired in generalising 
theory of mind perfonnance, but not in other 
functions relative to the other groups. 
Autistic children were able to understand false 
non-mental representations, but were unable to 
understand false mental representations. 
The children with autism performed at a lower 
level on theory of mind tasks, but at an average 
level on other cognitive tasks. 
Autistic children not impaired in ability to 
recObJTiise simple relationships, animate-
inanimate distinctions and simple reciprocity, 
but impaired in theory of mind perfonnance. 
Studies not supporting the specificity hypothesis 
Zelazo, Burack, 12 Down A significant relationship between theory of 
Benedetto & Frye, Syndrome (22;7) mind task petfonnance and alternative task 
(1996) !2Average(5;1) (card sorting) found for the Down Syndrome 
b1f0Up. 
Sparrevohn & 15 Autistic-low A pattern of perfonnance indicated a 
Howie, (1995) achieving (9;0) developmental sequence in theory of mind 
15 Autistic-high tasks, rather than a pervasive and continuing 
achieving (11;4) deficit. 
Peterson & Siegal, 26 Deaf(I0;7) Deaf children's difficulty on theory of mind 
(1995) tasks is possibly attributed to their difficulty 
with language, not a specific deficit in this area 
Klin, Volkmar & 29 Autistic (4;3) Other social deficits besides theory of mind 
Sparrow, (1992) 29 lntellectually found in children with autism. Therefore theory 
Disabled! 4;0) of mind cannot be a SEecific cognitive function. 
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belief task to assess the children's theory of mind, and a picture sequencing 
task to compare the children's ability to understand mental and physical 
events. The children with autism demonstrated poor results on the false belief 
task and mental state stories, relative to the children with Down syndrome and 
the children of average intelligence. 
Baron-Cohen (1989) and Charman and Baron-Cohen (I 992) conducted 
similar studies involving children with autism, children with intellectual 
disabilities and children of average intelligence. In their studies they included 
tests of cognitive function. These tests consisted of using non-mental false 
representations, tests for understanding of reciprocity and tests for 
understanding of animate-inanimate objects. Both of these studies found that 
children with autism were impaired in their theory of mind while having other 
cognitive functions such as recall of previous states, and person pennanence 
intact This finding led to these researchers to conclude that the theory of 
mind attainment is a specific cognitive domain, independent of other cognitive 
domains. 
On the other hand, there is also evidence that theory of mind is not in 
itself a specific domain, but that deficits on theory of mind tasks are closely 
related to deficits in other areas of cognitive functior 1g 
Zelazo et al. (1996) found a significant relationship between theory of 
mind and non-social rule use, as measured by a card sorting task, in children 
with Down Syndrome. This means that the students who perfonned poorly on 
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the theory of mind tasks also performed poorly on the card sorting task. They 
postulated that "difficulties in theory of mind may depend on more general 
difficulties in flexible reasoning, such as the ability to use a higher order rule" 
(p. 479) 
Peterson and Siegal (1995) conducted a study with 26 children with 
hearing impairments aged 8 to 13 years of age. Peterson and Siegal discuss 
the reasons for the deaf children's difficulty as possibly being attributed to 
their difficulty with language. They also state that the neurological 
explanation given (specificity hypothesis) in the case of autism is unlikely to be 
the same reason for the deaf children's difficulty on these tasks. They 
conclude that a better explanation is needed to explain the similar difficulty in 
theory of mind tasks observed in deaf children. 
Sparrevohn and Howie ( 1995) tested two groups of autistic children on 
theory of mind tasks in order to ascertain ifthere was a developmental 
progression of any sort. They tested high functioning autistic students and low 
functioning autistic students to determine ifthere was a difference in theory of 
mind task performance between the groups, and if this could be explained by 
overall functioning of the individual. Their results showed that there was a 
hierarchical pattern of performance across the tasks, suggesting a 
developmental sequence oftheory of mind ability, rather than a specific deficit 
in this area, and that the development is extremely slow in children with 
autism. There was also evidence to suggest that verbal ability of the children 
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contributed to their succe"; on theory of mind tasks. These findings are 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that theory of mind functions are specific to a 
cognitive domain. 
Klin, Volkmar and Sparrow ( 1992) studied a group of children with 
autism and a group of children with intellectual disabilities. These groups 
were matched for mental age. Klin et al. used the Vineland Adaptive 
Behaviour Scales to assess the social competence and social behaviours 
displayed by both of these groups. Their results indicated that social deficits in 
children with autism are pervasive and primary (occur early in the 
developmental sequence) and are not limited to deficits in theory of mind 
performance. The autistic children performed well on some areas of the 
Vineland test such as motor skills, but poorly on verbal ability. The children 
with intellectual disabilities performed as expected, given their lower level of 
general cognitive functioning, on the social, motor and verbal skills tested by 
the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales. These findings do not support the 
specificity hypothesis made in regards to theory of mind detlcits, as the auti>tic 
group performed poorly in a number of areas. 
The authors ofthe studies have reported that the children displayed 
deficits in theory of mind task performance and also displayed deficits in other 
areas of cognitive functions. Because the children have demonstrated a deticit 
in another area of cognitive functioning which is of the same severity as the 
deficit in the theory of mind area, the researchers have concluded that theory 
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of mind functions are directly related to cognitive functions in all other areas 
as well. This means that a child will most likely have a deficit in theory of 
mind if he or she has a deficit in general cognitive functioning. From this 
finding, Zelazo et al., Benedetto and Frye, Sparrevohn and Howie, Klin, 
Volkmar and Sparrow, and Peterson and Siegal, have stated that the 
specificity hypothesis made by some researchers is unable to be supported by 
their studies. 
There is evidence both for and against the specificity hypothesis in 
theory of mind. Therefore it is unclear whether or not theory of mind is or is 
not a specific cognitive domain. Previous studies have attempted to control for 
general cognitive functioning. The current study will also attempt to provide 
evidence either tbr or against the specificity hypothesis by using a measure of 
cognitive functioning which has not as yet been used by other researchers, as 
well as controlling for verbal ability by using a verbal mental age matching 
test. 
Testing Tlreory of Mind 
The tasks undertaken for this study are similar to those used to test for 
children's theory of mind in a number of other studies (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Hobson, 1993, Zelazo et al. 1996; Frith, Happe & Siddons, 1994; Happe, 
1995). 
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Baron-Cohen ( 1995) describes one example of a first-order theory of 
mind task as one in which the child must think about another person's false 
belief on viewing a Smarties packet which is shown to contain pencils. 
Children demonstrate a theory of mind if they can state that another person 
would be deceived by the packaging of a Smarties packet ifthat person was 
not shown what the real contents were (in this case, pencils). This is a theory 
of mind task because the child must utilise what he or she knows about the 
other person's beliefs (even if they are false) to predict the other person's 
behaviour. This is only one example of a first-order false belief task. 
Hobson ( 1993) describes another first-order theory of mind task, but 
with a more complex verbal story line. It is known as the Sally-Anne task. 
There are two characters, Sally who hides a marble and Anne who is out of the 
room at the time. The questions to the child are tocused on Anne's beliefs 
about the whereabouts ofthe marble. From the age of 3 or 4 years, children 
state that Anne will look for the marble where she last saw it, because they 
understand that Anne did not see Sally hide it and therefore that Anne must 
have a false belief about the marble's location. Before this age, children state 
that Anne will look for the marble in its correct location, because they do not 
take into account her lack of knowledge about the whereabouts ofthe marble 
and consequent false belief. 
Sparrevohn and Howie (1995) describe a second-order theory of mind 
task as one in which a child must determine how two people will think. For 
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example, "Anne thinks that Sally thinks ... ". Therefore if a child shows an 
ability to take into account the beliefs or desires of two people, then that child 
is demonstrating an understanding of second-order false belief. 
In order to be able to perform theory of mind tasks, it is necessary tbr 
the child to be able to see something from another's perspective. If the child is 
unable to see something from another's perspective, then he or she would not 
reasonably be able to pertbrm theory of mind tasks because they demand 
perspective-taking ability. A perspective-taking task has been described in 
Donaldson ( 1978). This task deals with the" ... child not appreciate(ing) that 
what he sees is relative to his own position; he takes it to represent absolute 
truth or reality ... "(Donaldson, 1978, p. 20). The Policeman Task 
(Donaldson, 1978, p. 21) involves a naughty boy hiding from a policeman 
behind four walls. Props are used to demonstrate this to the child. A 
simplified version of this perspective-taking task could be used to determine if 
the child has the pre-requisite ability to succeed on theory of mind tasks. 
However this has not been taken into account in any of the previous theory of 
mind studies. If the child is unable to pass this task, it can reasonably be 
assumed that he or she will have difficulty on the more challenging theory of 
mind tasks. 
In the present study, both children with intellectual disabilities and 
children of average intelligence of the same age are given theory of mind tasks 
to ensure that the theory of mind tasks used in the study are able to detect 
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developmental differences. A difference is expected to be found between the 
children of average intelligence matched for chronological age and the 
children with intellectual disabilities. 
Memory and Tlteory of Mind 
Norman ( 1982) states that "to remember is to have managed three 
things successfully: the acquisition, retention, and retrieval of information". 
This has implications for students who have intellectual disabilities. Students 
with intellectual disabilities have been found to have more limited memory 
than children without intellectual disabilities. The greater the intellectual 
deficit, the greater the memory deficit (Drew, Hardman & Logan, 1988). 
These deficits have been attributed to several factors, relating to all of 
Norman's requirements for memory. These include an inability to focus on 
relevant stimuli, inefficient rehearsal strategies, and an inability to benefit from 
incidental learning cues (Drew, Hardman & Logan, 1988). 
A number of studies have investigated memory and its relation to 
theory of mind. Benson, Abbeduto, Short, Nuccio and Maas (1993) conducted 
a study with 16 children with intellectual disabilities and 16 children of 
average intelligence, using both first and second-order scenarios. Benson, et 
al. were able to determine whether or not the students were able to follow the 
scenarios by asking content questions throughout the testing. They found that 
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" ... the poor perfonnance of the (children with intellectual disabilities) was 
not due to their inability to follow the critical events of the stories" (p. 430). 
Charman and Baron-Cohen ( 1992) studied 17 children with autism 
(mean age 13;6). 14 children with intellectual disabilities (mean age 14;5) and 
20 children of average ability (mean age 5; I). They used a false belief test 
with the children. They also asked questions to determine whether the 
students understood the task and could remember past e·<ents. Charman and 
Baron-Cohen found that memory was not a factor in the results that they 
obtained, as the children had no difticulty remembering the tasks and the 
questions put to them by the researchers. 
On the other hand, Welch-Ross ( 1997) conducted a study 40 children 
who ranged in age from 3 years. 6 months to 4 years. 6 months. These 
children were required to discuss three past events with their mother, and 
complete a set of theory of mind tasks. Welch-Ross found that the children's 
theory of mind scores were related positively to their memory responses, 
independent of their age and linguistic ability. 
As children with intellectual disabilities may have poorer memory 
functions than children of average intelligence, it is important to include 
memory check questions in any study of their theory of mind to determine 
whether memory is a significant factor in theory of mind performance. 
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Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not individuals 
with an intellectual disability perform more poorly on theory of mind tasks 
than age-matched children of average intelligence and verbal age-matched 
younger children of average intelligence. The study also investigates whether 
deficits in memory or in cognitive functioning can account for any deficits in 
theory of mind performance. 
The research was conducted within the framework of the uniqueness 
and specificity hypotheses. 
The uniqueness hypothesis was tested as follows. If theory of mind in 
children with intellectual disabilities develops at the same rate as their 
intellectual development, then their performance on theory of mind tasks 
should be comparable to the theory of mind performance of children of a 
younger chronological age matched on verbal mental age (Baron-Cohen, 
1995). This is shown on the right hand side of Figure I. However, if children 
with intellectual disabilities perform significantly more poorly on theory of 
mind tasks than younger children of the same verbal mental age, then this 
would provide evidence of a deficit in theory of mind in children with 
intellectual disabilities, similar to that already reported in children with autism. 
It would suggest that children with autism are not unique in showing a deficit 
in theory of mind, relative to their cognitive level, but that children with 
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intellectual disabilities show the same pattern. This is shown on the left hand 
side of Figure I. 
Perfonnance on Theory of mind tasks 
J 
Significant Difft::rence 
between lD and MA 
groups on theory of mind 
tasks 
lD group perform more 
poorly than predicted on 
the basis of verbal mental 
age 
Inconsistent with the 
Uniqueness Hypothesis 
No Significant Difference 
between lD and MA 
groups on theory of mind 
tasks 
l:o group perfonn no 
nore poorly than 
predicted on the basis of 
verbal mental age 
·-
Consistent with the 
Uniqueness Hypothesis 
Note: ID group~ children with intellectual disabilities. 
MA group - children of average intelligence matched on verbal mental age. 
Figure I. Possible results ofthe present study in terms of the uniqueness 
hypothesis. 
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The specificity hypothesis refers to the hypothesis that theory of mind 
functions are domain-specific and therefore separate from other normally 
developing cognitive functions. In the present study, this will be tested as 
follows. If a difference is found between the children with intellectual 
disabilities and the children of average intelligence matched for verbal mental 
age, then it will be necessary to determine whether the difference is due to 
theory of mind deficits or to general cognitive functioning. To do this a test of 
general cognitive functioning will be used as a covariate (see Figure 2). If 
there is still a significant difference after the covariate has been applied, then 
the results can be said to be consistent with the specificity hypothesis 
mentioned previously because this difference could not be accounted for by a 
generally poor level of cognitive functioning. (See the left side of Figure 2.). 
However, ifthere is no longer any significant difference found between the 
children with intellectual disabilities and the children of average intelligence 
when general cognitive functioning is used as a covariate, the results are 
inconsistent with the specificity hypothesis because any difference that was 
originally found can be accounted for by a generally lower level of cognitive 
functioning. (see the right side of Figure 2). 
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Ifthere is a Significant difference between 
the ID and MA groups 
Performance on theory of mind tasks with 
performance on cognitive function task used 
as a covariate 
Significant Difference No Significant Difference 
between the 1D and MA between the ID and MA 
groups groups 
Cognitive functioning Cognitive functioning 
does not account for the does account for the 
difference between the ID difference between the ID 
and MA groups and MA groups 
Consistent with Inconsistent with 
Specificity Hypothesis Specificity Hypothesis 
Note: ID group - children with intellectual disabilities. 
MA group - children of average intelligence matched on verbal mental age. 
Figure 2. Possible results ofthe present study in tenns of specificity 
hypothesis. 
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Research Questions 
The research questions that will be addressed in this study are as 
follows: 
(l) Do children with intellectual disabilities perform more poorly than (a) 
chronological age-matched children and (b) verbal mental age-matched 
children, on theory of mind tasks? 
(2) If there are differences between the children with intellectual disabilities 
and either of the other groups in theory of mind, can these differences be 
accounted for by cognitive functioning as measured by Ravens Coloured 
Progressive Matrices? 
(3) If there are differences between the children with intellectual disabilities 
and either of the other groups in theory of mind, can these differences be 
accounted for by differences in the children's memory for the details of the 
task? 
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Participants 
Chapter Ill 
METHODOLOGY 
The participants for this study were 45 children drawn from three 
populations. These populations were: children with intellectual disabilities 
who were drawn from Education Support Centres (ES group), children of 
average intellectual ability matched on chronological age with the children 
with intellectual disabilities (CA group) and children of average intellectual 
ability, matched on verbal skills with the children with intellectual disabilities 
(MA group). There were 15 children in each group. 
As shown in Table 3, the ages ofthe ES and CA groups were about 10 
years of age but, whereas the ES group had a mean Peabody Standard Score of 
61, the CA group had a mean Peabody Standard Score of 97, which is about 
average. The MA group, though only about 6 years of age, obtained the same 
level of raw score on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test as the ES group. 
The children with intellectual disabilities were drawn from five 
Education Support Centres and Units in the Perth Metropolitan area. The 
children in the other two groups were drawn from five state primary schools on 
the same sites as the Education Support Centres and Units. All of the schools 
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used for this study were located in areas which can be described as middle 
socio-economic status areas. 
Table 3. 
Characteristics of Children Participating in the Study. 
Group ES CA MA 
group group group 
N 15 15 15 
Sex 11:4 11:4 11:4 
M:F 
Age 10;0 (0;4) 10;0 (0;4) 6;0 (0;4) 
Mean (SD) 9'6- 10·7 , , 9;7- I 0;9, 5'6-6·5 , , 
Range 
Verbal Mental 5·8 , 9·8 , 6·1 , 
Age 
Peabody Raw 72 (15) I 04 (8) 69 (I 0) 
Score 
Mean (SD) 
Peabody Standard 61 (14) 97 (10) 99(13) 
Score 
Mean (SD) 
Ravens Raw 17.3 (5.3) 29.7 (2.3) 16.5 (3.6) 
Score 
Mean (SD) 
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Research Design 
The independent variable for this study was group (ES group, CA group 
and MA group). The dependent variables were the children's level of 
perfonnance on four theory of mind tasks. Cognitive function was used as a 
covariate. 
Tests and Materials 
Tests 
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (PPVT-R) (Dunn & 
Dunn, 1981) was used as an indicator of children's general verbal ability. The 
PPVT-R tests "receptive vocabulary" and gives a "quick estimate of one major 
aspect of verbal ability for subjects who have grown up in a standard English-
speaking environment" (Dunn & Dunn, 1981, p. 2). The test does not require 
reading or speech. In tenns of validity, the PPVT-R correlates (a) most highly 
with other measures of vocabulary, (b) moderately well with other tests of 
scholastic aptitude, and (c) reasonably with school achievement measured 
concurrently and less well predictively (Dunn & Dunn, I 981, pp. 67-68). The 
PPVT-R takes only I 0 minutes to administer, compared with the Weschler 
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) which take well over an hour to 
administer to each child. The PPVT-R is a quick and reliable way of 
estimating verbal mental age. It was, therefore, considered to be an 
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appropriate test on which to match children of average ability with older 
children with an intellectual disability. 
Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM) (Raven, Court & 
Raven, 1990), was used to assess the children's nonverbal cognitive ability. 
The RCPM tests "the ability to form creative new insights or the ability to form 
high level, largely nonverbal, constructs which make it easy to think about 
complex issues" (Raven, Court & Raven, 1990, p. 33). Studies have related 
performance on the Coloured Progressive Matrices to Piagetian classification, 
spatial and reasoning abilities and simultaneous processing (Raven, Court & 
Raven, I 990, p. 33). The RCPM has correlations of .6 to .7 with intelligence 
tests designed to be culturally fair. This test was used in this study as a 
measure of cognitive functioning. 
Materials 
The following materials were required for the perspective and theory of 
mind tasks: 
• two soft toys (a bear and an elephant) 
• four blocks of different colours (blue, red, yellow, green) 
• a large smarties tube 
• three dolls 
• a basket 
• a box 
41 
I 
• a bucket 
• a marble 
Procedure 
The tasks were given to the children on an individual basis in a quiet 
room. Each child was withdrawn from regular classroom activities for one 
session of approximately 25 minutes. Each child was first given the PPVT -R 
and the RCPM. Each of these tests was administered according to the 
standard procedure outlined in each of the test manuals. 
The children were then given a perspective task, and three theory of 
Mind (ToM) tasks. (See Appendices B toE for the complete scripts used to 
administer these tasks.) 
The perspective and theory of mind tasks were tape recorded. These 
tasks were administered as follows: 
Perspective Task 
This task has been modified from the "Policeman Task" described by 
Donaldson ( 1978). Each child was shown two soft toys and four blocks of 
various colours. The toys were arranged opposite each other and two blocks 
were placed in front of each toy. The child was asked ifthe teddy could see all 
of the blocks and if the elephant could see all of the blocks. A screen was 
placed in the middle of the toys, as shown in Figure 3, leaving two blocks and 
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one toy on either side of the screen. The child was then asked the following 
eight questions: 
I. Can the teddy see the blue block? 
2. Can the teddy see the red block? 
3. Can the teddy see the yellow block? 
4. Can the teddy see the green block? 
5. Can the elephant see the blue block? 
6. Can the elephant see the red block? 
7. Can the elephant see the yellow block? 
8. Can the elephant see the green block? 
D • • 0 • EJ 
~ Elephant 
Figure 3. 
Arrangement of materials for the Perspective-taking Task. 
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Smarties False Belief Task_ (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
Each child was shown a Smarties container and asked, "What do you 
think is in here?". The child was then shown that the tube actually contained 
pencils. The experimenter then closed the tube and asked the child two first-
order false belief questions. These were: "When I first showed you this tube 
what did you think was in here?" and "If (name of classmate) comes in who 
hasn't seen inside the tube, what will he/she think is inside here?" A memory 
check question was also asked: "What is really in the tube?" 
Sally-Anne False Belief Task_ (Hobson, 1993 ). 
In this task, two dolls, Sally and Anne were introduced. As shown in 
Figure 4, there was a basket in front of Sally and a box in front of Anne. The 
child was shown Sally placing a marble into her basket. Sally was then moved 
out of sight (see Figure 4, steps I and 2). Then the child was shown Anne 
transferring the marble from Sally's basket into her box, where it was hidden 
from view by a lid being placed on the box (see Figure 4, step 3). As shown in 
Figure 4, step 4, the experimenter then brought Sally back into view and asked 
the child the first order false belief question: "Where will Sally look for her 
marble?" 
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Figure4. 
Sequence of events in the Sally-Anne Task (Taken from Baron-Cohen, 1995, 
p. 70). 
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Two extra que>tions were used to test the child's memory of the events 
and language used: "Where is the marble really?" and "Where was the marble 
at the beginning?" 
Sally-Anne-Ben Task (Second order false belie!) 
In this modified version of the Sally Anne test, three dolls were used. 
The first doll, Sally, had a basket in front of her, the second doll, Anne, had a 
box in front of her, and the third doll, Ben, had a bucket in front of him. The 
child was shown Sally placing the marble into her basket and moved out of 
sight (see Figure 5, steps 1 and 2). The child was then shown Anne moving 
the marble from Sally's basket and placing it into her box (Figure 5, steps 3 
and 4). Anne was then moved out of sight. The child was then shown Ben 
moving the marble from Anne's box and placing it into the bucket where it 
was hidden from view by a lid covering the bucket (Figure 5, step 5). 
The experimenter then brought Sally back into view and the child was 
asked one first-order false belief question: "Where will Sally look for her 
marble?" (Figure 5, step 6). Then Anne was brought back into view and the 
second first-order false belief question "Where will Anne look for the 
marble?" was asked (Figure 5, step 7). The child was then asked the second-
order false belief question: "Where does Anne think that Sally would look for 
the marble?" (Figure 5, step 8) The memory questions asked for this task 
were: "Where did Sally put the marble?" and" Where did Anne put the 
marble?" 
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Figure 5. Sequence of events in the Sally-Anne Ben Task (Modified from 
Baron-Cohen, 1995, p. 70). 
47 
I 
Ethical Considerations 
Parents of participants in this study were assured that all personal 
information would be kept confidential. Identification numbers and not names 
were used on all forms. Parental and school approval was obtained before any 
testing occurred (see Appendix A for consent form). Testing was carried out 
by the researcher with no-one else present. All taped and written information 
was kept in a safe and secure location with access available only to the 
experimenter. All data will be destroyed after 5 years. The children responded 
positively to all of the tasks used in this study. 
48 
Chapter IV 
RESULTS 
This chapter deals with the results of the study. First there is a section 
on the scoring of the data and how this was done. This is followed by a report 
of the differences found between the groups on theory of mind performance 
and an analysis of the particular theory of mind tasks on which a difference 
was found. How general cognitive function and memory are related to theory 
of mind performance will then be examined, followed by a conclusion to draw 
all of the results together. 
The statistical computer package, SPSS for Windows, Version 6.1, was 
used for all analyses in this study. An alpha level of .05 was set for all 
analyses in the study. 
Scoring 
The first task given to the children was the perspective-taking task. 
This task was included to establish basic perspective-taking ability, which is a 
prerequisite for the theory otmind tasks in the study. This task was completed 
by all children with 100% accuracy. Therefore the results of this task will not 
be included in the remaining data analysis 
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The responses to the second task, the Smarties Task, in which each 
child was required to answer two first order false belief questions, were 
assigned a score of I if they got both questions correct and a score ofO if they 
did not. The third task asked the children only one first order false belief 
question and was assigned. a score of 1 ifthe answer was correct and a score of 
0 if it was not. The fourth task required the children to answer two first order 
questions and a second order false belief question. Each of these questions 
were scored as I if the answer was correct and 0 if it was not. 
In order to analyse the data for this study, first of all, the scores on all of 
the theory of mind tasks were summed for each child (see Table 4). This 
method of scoring and analysis has been used by previous researchers 
(Ozonoff & Miller, 1995; Sparrevohn & Howie, 1994; Happe, 1995). 
Difference in Theory of Mind Performance 
The differences among the groups on the theory of mind tasks were 
determined by examining the average total score for each of the groups (see 
Figure 6). When all of the scores for the theory of mind tasks were totalled, 
the MA group obtained a mean score of3.6 (SD = 1.2), the ES group obtained 
a mean score of2.8 (SD = 1.7) and theCA group obtained a mean score of 4.6 
(SD = 0.6), out of a possible 5. 
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Table 4. Obtaining the total theory of mind score. 
Task Order of Question 
Question 
2 First 
3 First 
4 First 
4 First 
4 Second 
"When I first showed you this tube what did 
you think was in here?'' 
"If (name of classmate) comes in who hasn't 
seen inside the tube, what will he/she think is 
inside here?'' 
"Where will Sally look for her marble?" 
"Where will Sally look for her marble?" 
"Where will Anne look for the marble?" 
"Where would Anne think that Sally would 
look for the marble?" 
Total 
51 
Possible 
Score 
5 
Mean Score on Theory 
of Mind Tasks 
• 
1 
•+-------------~----------~ 
MAGroup ESGroup CAGroup 
Figure 6. Total theory of mind scores for each group. 
An ANOV A was conducted in order to detennine whether there were 
any significant differences among the three groups. The results ofthe 
ANOV A indicated that there was a significant difference, F(2, 42) = 7.36, p = 
.002. Tukey's HSD tests were then applied to the data to determine where the 
difference lay. The only significant difference between the groups was 
between the ES group and theCA group, (p = .00 I). The difference between 
the MA group and the ES group was not significant (p = .22), and the 
difference between the MA group and theCA group was not significant (p = 
.10). The effect size for the AN OVA was .26. This means that 26% of the 
variance in the children's theory of mind scores can be accounted for by group. 
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In summary, overall on the theory of mind tasks, children with 
intellectual disabilities were not significantly poorer in perfonmance than the 
MA group but functioned at a significantly lower level than theCA group. 
Theory of Mind Tasks on whic/1 a Difference was Found 
Given the overall difference between the ES group and theCA group, 
the separate tasks were analysed to detenmine on which of them a difference in 
perfonmance between the groups occurred. Figure 7 shows the percentage 
correct that each group obtained for each of the five false belief questions. 
The ES group demonstrate lowest perfonmance across all of the tasks, followed 
by the MA group and then the CA group. 
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Figure 7. Perfonnance of each group on each task. 
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A chi square analysis was conducted on each of the tasks separately to 
determine if there were any differences between tasks. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 5. 
Using the chi square analyses, a significant difference was found 
between groups for task 4 first-order false belief questions I and 2. Both of 
these tasks required an answer that was of the first order, in preparation for the 
more difficult second order questions. There were no significant differences 
between groups for any of the other tasks. 
Table 5. Chi Square Analysis of Group Differences for each Task. 
Task Order of Question x' p 
2 first order 3.84 .14 
3 first order 3.34 .19 
4 first order 8.90 .01 
4 first order 9.51 .01 
4 second order 5.04 .08 
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In summary, the children with intellectual disabilities performed more 
poorly on task 4 first order questions, but the difference on the second order 
false belief task did not reach significance. 
Cognitive Functioning 
A general low 'eve! of cognitive functioning is a possible reason that 
may account for the poorer performance of children with intellectual 
disabilities on theory of mind tasks. The scores from the Raven's Coloured 
Progressive Matrices [RCPM] (Raven, Court & Raven, 1990) were used as a 
covariate to determine whether general cognitive functioning could account 
for the results. 
When the effects of cognitive functioning were statistically controlled 
using an ANCOVA, there was no significant difference between the groups on 
theory of mind score, F(2, 44) = 3.04, p = .06. The effect size for the 
ANCOV A was .13. This means that when cognitive functioning is taken into 
account 13% of the variance in the children's theory of mind scores can be 
accounted for by group. 
A correlation between RCPM and the children's total theory of mind 
scores revealed a significant relationship for the overall sample, r ( 43) = 0.61, 
p < 0.001. However, when correlation coefficients were calculated for each 
group separately, the relationship between the RCPM and the children's total 
theory of mind scores was significant only for the ES group, r (13) = 0. 76, p = 
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0.001, and not for theCA group, r (13) = 0.29,p = 0.29, or for the MA group, 
r (! 3) = 0.08, p = 0. 77. This difference could be due to the restricted range of 
RCPM scores in theCA group (27- 34) compared with the wider range of 
scores in the ES group (9- 27). However, restriction ofr~nge does not 
account for the low correlation in the MA group(! 1 - 23). Figure 8 shows the 
relationship between RCPM scores and total theory of mind scores for each 
group. 
In summary, because there was no significant difference between the 
groups when cognitive functioning was taken into account, the ES group's 
poorer performance on theory of mind tasks in general may be said to be 
accounted for by their generally lower level of cognitive functioning. 
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Figure 8. Scatterplot of RCPM scores and total theory of mind scores for each 
group. 
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Memory Performance 
Another factor that may account for the difference on theory of mind 
performance between the ES group and CA group is their difference in 
memory. In order to control for this, questions were asked throughout all of 
the tasks in regard to recall offactual information. These questions were 
related to the recall of single events that occurred throughout the tasks. 
All of the children achieved I 00% accuracy on the memory questions. 
Memory therefore could not account for any differences in the children's 
performance on theory of mind tasks. 
Conclusion 
The results obtained from the data show that there was a significant 
difference between the ES and CA groups on theory of mind performance, but 
no significant difference between the ES and MA groups. A lower level of 
cognitive functioning in the ES group accounted for the difference between 
the ES and CA groups on theory of mind performance, indicating a delay in 
general cognitive functioning, rather than a deficit in theory of mind. Memory 
could not account for differences in theory of mind performance. 
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ChapterV 
DISCUSSION 
The main aim of this study was to investigate whether or not a 
difference was evident between the three groups, children with intellectual 
disabilities (ES group), children of average intelligence of the same age as the 
children with intellectual disabilities (CA group) and children of average 
intelligence matched for verbal mental age (MA group), when tested for theory 
of mind task performance and whether this difference could be accounted for 
by memory difficulties and/or general cognitive functioning. The following 
chapter discusses the results which were obtained for this study and the 
significance and application of the findings. 
Evidence Regarding tile Uniqueness Hypothesis 
The first research question of this study dealt with determining whether 
the ES group performed more poorly than the CA group and the MA group on 
theory of mind tasks. !fa significant difference was found between the ES and 
MA groups on theory of mind performance, the results would be inconsistent 
with the uniqueness hypothesis which relates to theory of mind deficits being 
found only in children with autism and not in children with intellectual 
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disabilities. If there was not a significant difference between the ES group and 
MA group on theory of mind performance, the results would be consistent with 
the uniqueness hypothesis in that the children with intellectual disabilities 
show no evidence of a deficit like that of autistic children. As the ES group 
already display an intellectual disability, a significant difference between the 
CA and ES group was expected. 
As expected, a significant difference was found between the ES group 
and the CA group on theory of mind perfonnance. The difference found in 
this study is one which would be expected, being between the children with 
and without intellectual disabilities of the same age. The ES group would 
obviously perform more poorly than the children of average intelligence of the 
same age as they already display a developmental delay relative to this group. 
However, no significant difference was found between the ES group 
and the MA group. The failure to find a difference between the ES and MA 
groups is consistent with results found in several other studies (Happe, 1995; 
Charman & Baron-Cohen, !992; Baron-Cohen, !989). These researchers have 
argued that children with intellectual disabilities do not display a deficit in 
theory of mind, such as that found in children with autism. This study failed to 
find a deficit in theory of mind for ES group and therefore is consistent with 
this argument. The ES group in this study did not exhibit any deficit in theory 
of mind performance that would not have otherwise been expected, given their 
developmental delay. 
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Happe ( 1995) found that 41% of children with intellectual disabilities 
tested failed similar theory of mind tasks to those used in the current study. 
This percentage is comparable to the 44% of children matched on mental age 
who also failed the tasks in her study. In the present study, 44% of children 
with intellectual disabilities failed similar false belieftasks but only 28% of the 
MA group failed false belief tasks. Like the present study, Happe attempted to 
match the children with intellectual disabilities to a group of children of 
average intelligence matched on verbal mental age. However, her subject 
characteristics state that the children with intellectual disabilities had a verbal 
mental age of6;2 whereas the younger children of average intelligence had a 
verbal mental age of only 4;3 --a difference of nearly two years. In the present 
study the mental age match was much closer, with the ES group having a 
verbal mental age of 5;8 and the MA group having a verbal mental age of 6; I. 
This may account tbr the higher proportion of MA matched children in the 
present study who succeeded in the theory of mind tasks. 
Charman and Baron-Cohen ( 1992) also found that children with 
intellectual disabilities did not differ in their performance on theory of mind 
tasks when compared to 4-year-old children matched on mental age. The tasks 
used to test for theory of mind performance were similar to those used in the 
present study. 
Another study that used a similar method to the present study was 
conducted by Baron-Cohen ( 1989). He found that 90% of children with 
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average intel': gence matched for mental age and 60% of children with Down 
Syndrome passed false belief tasks. These are similar results to those found in 
the present study which indicated that 72% of children of average intelligence 
matched for mental age, and 56% of children with intellectual disabilities 
passed theory of mind tasks. Baron-Cohen argues that the proportion of 
children with Down Syndrome who passed the false belieftheory of mind 
tasks is not a low enough figure to say that a deficit in theory of mind exists. 
Only one study has found a deficit in theory of mind in children with 
intellectual disabilities. Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto and Frye ( 1996) found 
evidence that theory of mind deficits are demonstrated by children with 
intellectual disabilities relative to mental age matched children of average 
intelligence. Compared to the present study, however,Zelazo et al. used adults 
with severe intellectual disabilities who varied widely in chronological age 
from their 5-year-old mental age matched group. This is a possible reason for 
the differences found in theory of mind performance. 
The present study is inconsistent with previous research in failing to 
find evidence that children with mild to moderate intellectual disabilities show 
a deficit in theory of mind relati-re to children of average intelligence matched 
for mental age. 
61 
I 
Evidence Regarding the Specificity Hypothesis 
The second research question deals with whether or not general 
cognitive functioning can account tor any differences in theory of mind 
perfonnance. When cognitive functioning was taken into account, by using 
scores from the Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court & 
Raven, 1990) as a covariate, no differences were found between the groups. 
This is consistent with the results of Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto and Frye 
(1996) and Klin, Volkmar and Sparrow ( 1992). Both of these studies 
investigated children with intellectual disabilities. 
Zelazo et al. (1996) matched 22-year-old adults with Down Syndrome 
and 5-year-old children of average intelligence on mental age. They found that 
the difference in perfonnance on theory of mind tasks was equivalent to the 
ditference tbund between the groups on a rule use task. Zelazo eta!. used a 
rule-use task as an alternative cognitive functioning test to detennine whether 
or not theory of mind functions were domain-specific. The present study used 
the RCPM as a test of cognitive functioning and found it correlated 
significantly with theory of mind pertbnnance of children with intellectual 
disabilities, and that any differences between groups could be explained by the 
child's level of cognitive functioning. 
Klin, Volkmar and Sparrow (1992) tested the specificity hypothesis 
made by some researchers by comparing the participants' scores on a 
socialisation and motor skills test. The researchers found that the children 
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with intellectual disabilities displayed early social and motor skills at a level 
that would be expected, given their developmental delay. The researchers 
stated that as there was no evidence of a greater deficit in one particular area 
of social skill attainment, that specificity (or a domain-specific function) could 
not be supported by their study. Where Klin et al. ( 1992) used social cognition 
to test for specificity, the present study has used general cognitive functioning 
in the form of the RCPM, which tests problem solving and spatial abilities, 
rather than other social abilities. 
These findings indicate that theory of mind development in children 
with intellectual disabilities is consistent with their development in other areas 
of cognition. 
In contrast to these findings, other researchers (Charman & Baron-
Cohen, 1992; Leslie, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1991) have found evidence for the 
domain-specificity oftheory of mind functions in children with intellectual 
disabilities. All of these studies, however, have used a different measure, other 
than general cognitive functioning, with which to draw their conclusions. For 
example, Charman and Baron-Cohen used a comparison between false belief 
tests and false drawing tests to obtain their results, Leslie used a picture-
sequencing task to compare with theol)' of mind performance, and Baron-
Cohen used tests of relationship recognition, simple reciprocity and 
understanding of animate-inanimate distinction to compare with theol)' of 
mind performance. These measures do test other cognitive functions, but do 
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not specifically test general cognitive functioning. In addition to different tests 
used to determine specificity, the children with intellectual disabilities 
participating in these studies were a lot older than the children of average 
intelligence matched for mental age. This may have had some bearing on the 
results of these studies. 
In the present study, when correlations between the students' total 
theory of mind scores and the RCPM scores were calculated, the overall 
correlation showed that general cognitive functioning was a significant factor 
in theory of mind performance. However, when correlations were performed 
for the individual groups, only the ES group showed that general cognitive 
functioning was a significant factor in theory of mind performance. The other 
two groups displayed non-significant correlations between these factors. A 
possible explanation for the CA groups' non-significant finding was their 
restricted range of RCPM scores. However, this is not the case for the MA 
group. It is difficult to account for the non-significant finding for this group. 
However, as far as the children with intellectual disabilities are 
concerned, the present study shows that any delays in theory of mind can be 
adequately accounted for by more general functions such as their verbal mental 
age and general cognitive functioning. 
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Cognitive Functions Used During Testing 
Given that performance on theory of mind tasks by children with 
intellectual disabilities appears not to be a separate function, but related to 
general cognitive functioning, the question arises as to what general cognitive 
functions are used during the completion of such tasks. When performing 
theory of mind tasks, children with intellectual disabilities use a number of 
different cognitive functions. Some of the more obvious of these are language 
(verbal ability) and memory. Memory will be discussed further in the 
following section. 
In order to understand the tasks and what is required of them, the 
children with intellectual disabilities need to draw on their linguistic ability. 
They must be able to understand the structure of the sentences (syntax), the 
meaning behind the words (semantics) and the purpose of the language 
(pragmatics). These skills are required to interpret the scenarios that are 
presented to them, understand the questions asked, interpret what is required 
of them in terms of an answer, and have the ability to communicate a response 
back to the researcher. Language ability in the present study was controlled 
for by matching the students on verbal mental age using the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary test. 
Some of the children with intellectual disabilities appeared to find these 
linguistic demands too heavy, and tried to make use of other aspects of the 
context by looking at the researcher tbr non-verbal cues before answering any 
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questions. Two students also held their hands in a hovering position over a 
particular choice for their answer and attempted to make eye contact with the 
researcher, as ifto check that their answers would be correct. The researcher 
remained passive and straight-faced throughout the sessions in order to ensure 
that no non-verbal cues were given. 
It was also noticed that a larger number of children with intellectual 
disabilities took a longer amount oftime to answer questions put to them than 
children in the other groups. They exhibited a number of reasoning or 
"thinking" poses, such as holding their faces between their hands, sucking on a 
linger, and screwing up their faces in concentration. Although no actual 
timing of the children's responses was conducted in this study, it would be 
interesting for future research to see if this has any relation to the children's 
performance on theory of mind tasks. 
The theory of mind tasks also appear to place demands on children's 
sense of spatial orientation. They demonstrated this by using their hands to go 
through the scenario again, and also by moving their heads from side to side, 
as if they were putting themselves in the doll's position. It was as if they were 
attempting to take the >patial orientation of the doll in order to answer the 
question. 
These are some of the cognitive functions that may be used by children 
with intellectual disabilities when they are completing theory of mind tasks. 
Therefore both the statistical analyses in the present study, as well as the 
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anecdotal observations made during testing suggest that theory of mind tasks 
demand a number of different cognitive functions working together to give 
children insight into others' beliefs and desires, and to enable them to predict 
behaviour of others from this knowledge. 
Memory 
The third research question deals with whether or not memory can 
account for any differences on theory of mind performance. All of the 
participants were asked memory check questions throughout the tasks. All of 
these questions were answered with 100% accuracy by all groups. Therefore 
memory was found not to be a significant factor in the theory of mind 
performance. 
The memory questions that were used throughout the study demanded 
recall of one piece of information at a time, whereas the theory of mind task 
demands simultaneous processing of several pieces. It is therefore possible 
that the memory tasks did not account for all possible memory demands. 
Davis and Pratt (1995) conducted a study using forward digit span and 
backward digit span to determine if a memory task would predict theory of 
mind perfonnance. Forward digit span tests articulatory loop capacity, which 
is responsible for short-term storage of verbal and spatial infonnation. 
Backward digit span tests central executive capacity, which is responsible for 
active processing, such as encoding, retrieving and manipulating information. 
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Davis and Pratt found that backward digit span predicted theory of mind 
perfonnance, but forward digit span did not. They found that backward digit 
span was a better indicator of theory of mind task perfonnance than age and 
verbal skills. This would indicate that backward digit span should be used in 
future research to further investigate the role of memory in theory of mind task 
perfonnance. 
Perfonnance on theory of mind tasks doesn't appear to depend on 
articulatory loop capacity as measured by simple recall of infonnation but does 
appear to depend on the ability of the central executive function to retrieve and 
manipulate infonnation. 
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Rt'searclt 
The tasks that were used in this study were all standard theory of mind 
tasks. However, the children were asked only one second-order false belief 
question in the study. This is a concern, as it may not have allowed for the 
children, particularly those in theCA group, to show true perfonnance on 
these types of questions. The older children of average intelligence reached 
ceiling, so a more difficult theory of mind task would be appropriate for these 
children. 
In addition, it is possible for children to guess the correct answers 
without really understanding second-order theory of mind. For first order 
questions there was a 50% chance of obtaining a correct answer by guessing, 
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and for the second-order questions there was a 33% chance of obtaining the 
correct answer by guessing. Inclusion of one or more extra second-order 
theory of mind tasks would have allowed for chance events to be better 
controlled. This was also a concern of Benson, Abbeduto, Short, Nuccio and 
Maas (1993 ). 
In addition, another dependent variable could have included the time 
taken to respond to the theory of mind questions. It was noted in this study 
that the children with intellectual disabilities appeared to take longer than the 
other groups to answer these questions. Maybe a more sensitive measure than 
the number of questions correctly answered could have been used to determine 
theory of mind performance. 
Backward digit span memory checks could also have been added to the 
study to test for executive control function, which would have tested the 
children's ability to encode, retrieve and manipulate information, rather than 
testing for straight recall offacts. 
Using groups of different cognitive abilities for comparison would be 
useful for further research. The children with intellectual disabilities tested in 
this study were in the mild to moderate category of intellectual disability, and 
the children without intellectual disabilities were of average intelligence. By 
using groups of mild, moderate and severe intellectual disability, and children 
of low-average intelligence, a broader comparison of theory of mind 
functioning could have been achieved. 
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Implications for Education 
The main implication of this study for education is that the children 
with intellectual disabilities do not appear to have a specific deficit in theory of 
mind performance. This is an encouraging result because teachers can teach 
skills in the social domain to children with intellectual disabilities with the 
confidence that these children do not have a particular deficit in their ability to 
see things from another's point of view. If children with intellectual 
disabilities have difficulty learning social skills, it is most likely due to their 
cognitive ability and level of adaptive skills. 
Swettenham (1996) attempted to teach theory of mind skills to children 
with Down Syndrome. The study was conducted using a group of children 
with Down Syndrome, with a mean age of II ;9, matched on verbal mental age 
with a group of children of average intelligence, with a mean age of 3;5. All of 
these children had previously failed theory of mind tasks. Using computer 
technology, the children were taught basic theory of mind scenarios. At a 3-
month follow-up, all of the children were successful at completing theory of 
mind tasks, which differed in scenario from the originally taught tasks. As 
these children were close to the age at which theory of mind is supposed to 
exhibit itself, it is possible that they would have begun to understand this 
concept on their own without any training in the near future. The fact that the 
children had no difficulty with theory of mind concepts at a 3-month follow-up 
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however suggests that, once obtained, this concept is maintained by these 
children. 
Summary 
In summary, there is no evidence that children with intellectual 
disabilities have a deficit in theory of mind in the way that children with 
autism have. This study also does not support the specificity hypothesis made 
in relation to theory of mind that theory of mind functions are domain-specific 
and separate to other cognitive functions. 
There is a need, however, for more research in this area, particularly in 
relation to children of different cognitive levels. There also needs to be greater 
investigation of the reasons for the deficit being found in certain groups, while 
not being found in others. By studying the causes of the deficits in these areas, 
researchers may be able to extend their knowledge base on theory of mind and 
its origins. This would in tum enable educators to better plan for the needs of 
their students, by being aware offactors which may affect their social learning. 
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Appendix A 
Consent Letter for Parents 
Dear Parent or Guardian, 
lam conducting research to find out whether children can see different people's 
points of view. This is an important skill, both at school and in the community. lf 
teachers are able to understand the child's ability to adopt another person's 
perspective, they will be able to teach them life skills which are relevant to their 
needs, now and in the future. 
I am writing to ask for your consent to include your child in this research. If you 
agree, your child will be taken out of the classroom for one 30-35 minute session to 
a quiet room in the school, and given several tasks to complete. Children generally 
enjoy these sessions and treat them as games. Your child will be asked to talk about 
what he or she is doing and his/her comments will be audio taped. Nobody other 
than the researcher will listen to the tapes. No names will be reported. 
If you have any questions about this research please phone Dianne Campbell on 
ph: 9123 4567. I will be happy to answer any questions. 
Yours faithfully, 
Dianne Campbell 
Honours Student- Faculty of Education 
Edith Cowan University 
I have read the information above and any questions I asked have been answered to 
my satisfaction. I consent to my child----c~----,o------­
participating in the research, realising 1 may withdraw at any time. 
Name Signature Date 
78 
Appendix B 
Script for Perspective Task 
Experimenter: "Here I have a teddy bear and an elephant. Between them 
are four blocks. Can the teddy see all of the blocks?" 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Can the elephant see all of the blocks?" 
Child: (replies) 
(Place a screen to separate two of the blocks.) 
Experimenter: "Can the teddy see the blue block?" (Point to the blue block.) 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Can the teddy see the red block?" (Point to the red block.) 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Can the teddy see the green block?" (Point to the green block.) 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Can the teddy see the yellow block?" (Point to the yellow 
block.) 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Can the elephant see the blue block?" (Point to the blue 
block.) 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Can the elephant see the red block?" (Point to the red block.) 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Can the elephant see the green block?" (Point to the green 
block.) 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Can the elephant see the yellow block?" (Point to the yellow 
block.) 
Child: (replies) 
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Appendix C 
Script for Smarties Task 
(Show the child a smarties container.) 
Experimenter: "What do you think is in here?" 
Child: (replies) 
(Show the child what is inside the tube.) 
Experimenter: "When I first showed you this tube what did you think 
was in here" 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "lf(name of classmate) comes in who hasn't seen inside 
the tube, what will he/,he think is inside here?" 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "What was really in the tube?" 
Child: (replies) 
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Script for Sally Anne False Belief Task 
Experimenter: "This is Sally and this is Anne. Sally has a basket in front of 
her and Anne has a box in front of her" (Demonstrate this scenario.) 
"Sally has a marble which she puts in her basket. Then she leaves the 
room. Anne moves the marble from the basket to her box. Sally then 
comes back into the room. Where will Sally look for her marble?" 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Where is the marble really?" 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Where was the marble at the beginning?" 
Child: (replies) 
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Script for Sally/Anne/Ben False Belief Task 
Experimenter: "Sally and Anne are now joined by a friend of theirs 
named Ben. In front of Ben there is a bucket. Sally places her marble 
into her basket and leaves the room. Anne then moves the marble from 
Sally's basket and puts it into her box. She also leaves the room. Ben 
then moves the marble from Anne's box and puts it into his bucket. 
Sally comes back into the room. Where will Sally look for her marble?" 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: "Anne comes back into the room. Where will Anne look 
for the marble?" 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: 
marble?" 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: 
Child: (replies) 
Experimenter: 
Child: (replies) 
"Where would Anne think that Sally would look for the 
"Where did Sally put the marble?" 
"Where did Ben put the marble?" 
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